Can the Trustee Recover?  Imputation of Fraud to Bankruptcy Trustees in Suits Against Third-Party Service Providers by Wasserman, Samuel C.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 77 Issue 1 Article 9 
2008 
Can the Trustee Recover? Imputation of Fraud to Bankruptcy 
Trustees in Suits Against Third-Party Service Providers 
Samuel C. Wasserman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Samuel C. Wasserman, Can the Trustee Recover? Imputation of Fraud to Bankruptcy Trustees in Suits 
Against Third-Party Service Providers, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 365 (2008). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol77/iss1/9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Can the Trustee Recover? Imputation of Fraud to Bankruptcy Trustees in Suits 
Against Third-Party Service Providers 
Cover Page Footnote 
J.D. Candidate, 2009, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2003, University of Pennsylvania. Thank you 
to Professor Thomas Lee for his invaluable guidance and to my family for all their support. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol77/iss1/9 
CAN THE TRUSTEE RECOVER?
IMPUTATION OF FRAUD TO BANKRUPTCY
TRUSTEES IN SUITS AGAINST THIRD-PARTY
SERVICE PROVIDERS
Samuel C. Wasserman*
Corporate fraud has become a familiar headline over the last decade and
has forced several companies whose managers have committed that fraud
to file for bankruptcy. In these cases, a trustee will often be appointed to
represent and manage the bankruptcy estate. This trustee is vested with the
rights of the debtor corporation upon filing and may try to sue third-party
service providers (e.g., accounting firms, law firms, investment banks) for
conspiring in, or negligently failing to detect, the fraud. Federal and state
courts have disagreed over whether the bankruptcy trustee should be
permitted to recover damages from these third parties. Some find that the
trustee is burdened by the fraud and cannot recover, while others decide
that the trustee should not be burdened by it. But the line between these
two camps cannot be drawn cleanly. Courts that reach the same conclusion
often do so for significantly different reasons. This Note seeks to place
these decisions into a clear and more understandable framework and
proposes a balance between the use of federal and state law that should
provide guidance to the courts when considering this matter in the future.
INTRODUCTION
In April 2003, DVI Inc. was losing money. The company provided loans
for hospitals to buy medical equipment, and many of its borrowers had
begun to default. As its cash flow diminished, the company tried to hide its
losses by falsifying its Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings.'
Months later, when investigations indicated that DVI had been concealing
its true financial condition, the company filed for bankruptcy. 2 Steven
Garfinkel, DVI's Chief Financial Officer, became one of the first people to
be successfully prosecuted under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.3
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2003, University of
Pennsylvania. Thank you to Professor Thomas Lee for his invaluable guidance and to my
family for all their support.
1. Anthony Lin, Lawyers' New Nightmare: Bankruptcy Trustee Suits, N.Y.L.J., Nov.
26, 2007, at 1.
2. Id.
3. Id.
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But this was not the end of the story. On behalf of the corporation, the
bankruptcy trustee (appointed to oversee DVI's bankruptcy estate) sued
Clifford Chance LLP, a law firm that had been retained by DVI at the time
of the false SEC filings, for breach of contract. 4 The trustee alleged that the
law firm was aware of the fraud and had participated in it by preparing the
false filings. 5 Clifford Chance moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the
trustee should not recover because he "stood in the shoes" of the
corporation (DVI) that had allegedly committed the fraud in the first place.6
The judge declined to dismiss the claims, 7 leaving the law firm potentially
subject to liability.
Companies such as Enron, WorldCom, Refco, and Parmalat have all
become household names in the wake of similar scandals involving
managers who falsified financial statements or performed other illegal
transactions. By hiding losses, inflating revenues, or other forms of
financial manipulation, these managers gave investors and creditors a false
impression of their companies' fiscal health. 8 When the fraud became
public and the companies' true financial condition was revealed, investors
realized that the companies' stock was not worth what they had thought it
was worth. As large numbers of investors sold their stock, the stock price
plummeted. 9  In addition, given the companies' strained financial
conditions, managers foresaw an inability to satisfy creditors' demands. As
a result, the companies chose to file for bankruptcy relief.' 0 Officers of
some of the corporations were charged with, and convicted of, fraud;1 and
new federal and state statutes were enacted to address the problem. 12
Third-party service providers, such as banks, law firms, and accounting
firms, are, by the nature of their services, often connected to such fraudulent
4. See Complaint at 2, Buckley v. Clifford Chance LLP, No. 06-CV-1003 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 6, 2006).
5. Lin, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Bloomberg News, Files Suggest Double-Billing by Parmalat, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 2, 2004, at A8 (Parmalat's managers allegedly double booked receivables to inflate
revenue, which in turn made it easier for the company to acquire financing); Carl Hulse,
Lawmakers Say Files Show Flagrant WorldCom Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2002, at C7
(noting that over several years, WorldCom executives helped inflate the company's earnings
by hiding costs); Reuters, Ex-Refco Executive Pleads Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2007, at
C6 (Refco executive Phillip R. Bennett committed fraud by concealing $430 million in bad
customer debt).
9. Enron's stock price, once worth as much as $90, became nearly worthless around the
time it filed for bankruptcy. See Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Enron Corp.
Files Largest U.S. Claim for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2001, at Al. Refco's stock
also became nearly worthless after trading above $28 the week before the company disclosed
its hidden debt. See Eric Dash & Jenny Anderson, How a Big Investor Fell into the Refco
Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2005, at C4.
10. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, A Bankruptcy Filing Might Be the Best Remaining
Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at C6.
11. See, e.g., John R. Emshwiller, Gary McWilliams & Ann Davis, Lay, Skilling Are
Convicted of Fraud, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2006, at Al.
12. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 7241, 7262 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2006).
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activity. 13 The lawyers may have prepared the documents for the false
transactions; the banks may have helped structure the transactions; and the
accounting firms may have audited the financial statements that contained
inflated earnings. 14 It is not always clear whether the third parties actively
abetted the fraud, negligently failed to detect the fraud, or were merely
innocent victims of the company's deception. Nevertheless, investors and
others who have suffered losses as a result of the fraud may be inclined to
bring suit against one or more of these third-party service providers,
alleging that they were partly responsible for their losses. 15 Such third
parties are appealing targets because they tend to have more resources than
the now-bankrupt corporation and are therefore more likely to be able to
pay damage awards.
As illustrated in the DVI case, the trustee of the bankrupt corporation's
estate may be among those who seek recovery from one of the third
parties. 16 In theory, the purpose of any suit brought by a bankruptcy trustee
would be to recover money that would ultimately be used to satisfy the
corporation's creditors. 17  However, there is an important difference
between a claim brought against a third party by the trustee and a claim
brought by investors or others who have been harmed. Unlike investors,
creditors, or others who might bring claims against a third party, the trustee
is a legal representative of the bankrupt corporation's estate, "vested with
the right, title, and power of the bankrupt as of the date of adjudication."' 8
The bankruptcy estate that the trustee represents is defined by section 541
of the federal Bankruptcy Code. "Such estate is comprised of ... all legal
or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of
the case." 19 Therefore, the trustee inherits all of the debtor's rights and
interests at the time of filing. And if, as a matter of law, the trustee is the
13. See, e.g., Lin, supra note 1 (explaining that DVI'S law firm allegedly played a role
in filing false documents with the SEC).
14. See, e.g., Buckley v. Deloitte & Touche USA LLP, No. 06 Civ. 3291, 2007 WL
1491403, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2007) (noting that the accounting firm allegedly
produced certified audit opinions evidencing DVI's fiscal health).
15. In perhaps the most well known of this type of case, a class-action suit was brought
against Arthur Andersen in 2002 for destroying documents relating to the Enron fraud. See
Michael Brick, Lawyer Known for Class Actions Will Lead the Enron Plaintiffs, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 16, 2002, at C1. In 2004, Parmalat filed a lawsuit against Citigroup, claiming that "the
investment bank knowingly helped structure complex transactions that misled shareholders
and cost them billions of dollars." See Eric Dash, Parmalat Sues Citigroup over
Transactions, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2004, at C7. More recently, the trustee of the Refco
Litigation Trust sued Chicago-based law firm, Mayer Brown LLP (formerly Mayer, Brown,
Rowe & Maw LLP) for handling sham transactions used to cover up massive losses. See Lin,
supra note 1.
16. See Lin, supra note 1.
17. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of PSA, Inc. v. Edwards, 437 F.3d
1145, 1151 (11 th Cir. 2006).
18. ALEXANDER L. PASKAY, HANDBOOK FOR TRUSTEES AND RECEIVERS IN BANKRUPTCY
223 (Matthew Bender & Co, 1978) (1968).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006).
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debtor corporation that committed fraud, why should he be entitled to any
recovery?
Over the last decade, a debate has emerged over whether a bankruptcy
trustee should be permitted to recover from a third party for abetting, or
failing to detect, the past fraudulent behavior perpetrated by the managers
of the debtor corporation whose bankruptcy estate he represents. One side
of the debate argues that the trustee is tainted by the fraud of the managers
of the corporation in whose shoes he appears to stand, and thus should not
be able to recover from third parties.20 From this perspective, allowing the
trustee to recover would be tantamount to allowing a guilty party to recover
damages from "accomplices" to its own fraud.21
The other side generally believes that the trustee should not be burdened
by the fraud and therefore should be able to recover from third parties.22
Because the recovery will ultimately go to innocent creditors, proponents of
this argument see no reason why third parties at fault should not be liable to
the trustee for their breach of duty.23 On this view, the trustee is cast as a
vehicle for the satisfaction of the claims of innocent creditors and not as the
legal stand-in for the corporation and its managers.
Part I of this Note discusses relevant principles of bankruptcy law, the
role and standing of the trustee, and general agency principles. It highlights
the basic methods of analysis that courts and commentators have used to
decide the issue, while emphasizing the inconsistency of these approaches.
Part II articulates, in detail, the split between those who think the
bankruptcy trustee (of a corporation whose managers have committed
fraud) should be able to recover from third-party service providers for
playing a role in the fraud, and those who think recovery should be
prohibited.
Part III explains that a principal reason for the split among courts is
confusion about the role of section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code in the
matter. It then proposes a reading of that section that would resolve the
confusion. Section 541 states that the bankruptcy "estate is comprised of
... all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case." 24  Some courts read this federal statute as
foreclosing any possibility, under state or federal law, that the trustee might
have any legal claims against third parties that the company would not have
had.25 Other courts, relying to some extent on the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in O 'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC,26 have concluded that the rights
20. See infra Part II.A.
21. See infra Part II.A.
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. See infra Part II.B.
24. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).
25. See infra Part II.A. 1; see, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of PSA, Inc.
v. Edwards, 437 F.3d 1145 (1 1th Cir. 2006); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F.
Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340 (3d Cir. 2001); In re Hedged-Invs. Assocs., 84 F.3d 1281 (10th
Cir. 1996).
26. 512 U.S. 79 (1994).
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and interests of the estate are defined exclusively by state law, without
reference to section 541.27 Still, other courts fall somewhere between these
poles.28 Part III suggests that section 541 does apply to the validity of a
trustee's claims against third parties, but that the federal statute itself invites
the incorporation of state law. It argues that the statutory phrase, "at the
commencement of the case," does place certain limitations on the manner in
which state law may define the rights and interests of the bankruptcy estate:
namely, that state law may not permit the rights of the estate to be altered
because of events occurring after the bankruptcy filing. Part III concludes
by suggesting how these insights could be used to guide courts in future
cases involving third-party claims by trustees, hopefully leading to more
consistent, predictable outcomes.
I. BANKRUPTCY LAW MEETS AGENCY LAW: THE GENESIS OF A DEBATE
Part I.A of this Note discusses the details of the bankruptcy process, as
well as the role and standing of the trustee in bankruptcy. Part I.B discusses
agency law and imputation doctrine as it relates to bankruptcy cases. Part
I.C briefly highlights the basic methods of analysis that courts and
commentators have used to decide the issue while pointing out the
inconsistency of these approaches.
A. The Bankruptcy Process and the Trustee
There tend to be common threads in bankruptcies that result from
corporate fraud. In many cases, the fraud consists of inflated earnings or
hidden debt that gives the public a misleading picture of a company's fiscal
health. 29 This false impression of a company's well-being often makes it
easier for the company to obtain financing, which, given its actual
condition, it is unlikely to be able to repay.30 When the fraud becomes
public, the company comes under increasing pressure from its creditors,
who now realize that the company may not have the money to repay
them.31 In the face of such pressure and continuing losses, the company
will often file a bankruptcy petition.32
The filing of a bankruptcy petition constitutes an order of relief,
temporarily preventing creditors from seeking to satisfy their claims.33 In
this way, the bankruptcy process helps slow the deterioration of the
business, giving the company "breathing space" to turn its business around
27. See infra Part II.B.2; see, e.g., In re Jack Greenberg, Inc., 240 B.R. 486 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1999); NCP Litig. Trust v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871 (N.J. 2006).
28. See, e.g., Baena v. KPMG, 453 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006).
29. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
30. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
31. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
32. A debtor need not be insolvent in order to file a bankruptcy petition. CHARLES J.
TABB & RALPH BRUBAKER, BANKRUPTCY LAW: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE 80 (2d
ed. 2006).
33. MARTIN A. FREY ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO BANKRUPTCY LAW 423 (3d ed. 1997).
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if it so chooses and to satisfy its creditors as best it can in an orderly
fashion. 34
This is in line with the two most commonly stated goals of bankruptcy:
to satisfy as many creditors as possible and to relieve unfortunate and
honest debtors of "perpetual bondage to their creditors." 35 However, there
is also a compelling economic justification for the bankruptcy process.
Without the bankruptcy process, each creditor would individually rush to
claim the debtor's assets when the debtor filed. These assets, sold off to
creditors individually, might not be worth as much as the company as a
whole if it were to continue operations. 36 Therefore, it is often in the
creditors' collective interest to have a procedure enabling a company to
remain whole and continue operations (if it so chooses) while insolvent.37
In this light, the critical question in bankruptcy is not whether the honest
debtor deserves a fresh start, but whether it is economically advantageous
for the debtor to remain whole for a time (or perhaps even to continue
business), rather than immediately sell off its assets to the first-in-line
creditors who demand payment.38
To achieve these goals in an orderly manner, bankruptcy law prescribes
an extensive and complicated system of relief. A few integral
characteristics of that process are relevant to this discussion. First, upon
filing for bankruptcy, a bankruptcy estate is created. 39 The estate is
comprised of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of
the commencement of the case." 40 Put more simply, the estate "includes all
kinds of property, including tangible or intangible property," that belonged
to the debtor.41 This includes causes of action that the debtor had against
others at the time of filing.42
The abovementioned temporary prohibition on creditors seeking to
collect their debt is called the "automatic stay." 43 The "automatic stay"
goes into effect upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition. 44 It serves to
preserve the assets of the estate so that they can be distributed in accordance
with bankruptcy procedures. 45 In addition to barring actions by creditors to
34. ELIZABETH WARREN, BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY 18 (1993).
35. See TABB, supra note 32, at 64 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1833)).
36. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 14 (1986)
("[T]he most obvious reason for a collective system of creditor collection is to make sure
that creditors, in pursuing their individual remedies, do not actually decrease the aggregate
value of the assets that will be used to repay them.").
37. Thomas Jackson notes that the bankruptcy process allows creditors not to have to
spend excess time and money monitoring the debtor to ensure that they will be the first in
line to get repaid. Id. at 16.
38. Id. at 5.
39. See FREY, supra note 33, at 423.
40. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006).
41. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 82 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5868.
42. Id.
43. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6); see also FREY, supra note 33, at 423.
44. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
45. See TABB, supra note 32, at 193.
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satisfy their debts, the stay prohibits "nearly all non-criminal actions against
the debtor, the debtor's property or property of the estate."'46
Other features of the process depend on whether the company is filing for
bankruptcy under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11.47 If a company wants to cease
doing business and liquidate its assets, it files a Chapter 7 petition. 48 In a
Chapter 7 proceeding, all the property of the estate is distributed to creditors
in accordance with the priority of their claims.49 On the other hand, if a
company desires to continue operating its business, it files a Chapter 11
reorganization petition.50  In such cases, the debtor can create a
reorganization plan, showing how the debtor intends to overcome its
financial difficulties and become a viable business again.51 The creditors
must accept the plan in order for it to go into effect.52
A trustee is always appointed to manage the estate during the Chapter 7
bankruptcy proceeding.53 A trustee is also commonly appointed in Chapter
11 cases where the current management of the debtor corporation has
engaged in fraud or has grossly mismanaged the affairs of the corporation. 54
The trustee has various administrative duties outlined in the Bankruptcy
Code. 55 For example, it is his duty to collect the property of the estate.56
He also has a "duty to preserve all [the] properties" in his possession 57 and
to "be accountable for all property received. 58
The trustee's purpose is to achieve an equitable distribution of the
bankrupt's assets to its creditors, and "to relieve the bankrupt of his debts
through [a] discharge proceeding. '59 The trustee represents the bankrupt
debtor in the sense that he "succeeds to the interest of the bankrupt, and he
is vested with the right, title, and power of the bankrupt as of the date of
adjudication." 60 But he is also a representative of the creditors and holds
the assets of the estate in trust for their benefit. 61 He is not subject to the
46. MICHAEL J. HERBERT, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY 106 (1995).
47. There are other chapters under which one can file for bankruptcy, but these are the
two most relevant to this discussion.
48. HERBERT, supra note 46, at 291.
49. Id. at 301; see also, FREY, supra note 33, at 112-17, 302.
50. See HERBERT, supra note 46, at 303.
51. See FREY, supra note 33, at 435.
52. Id. at 436. There are circumstances in which a reorganization plan may be approved
without the consent of certain creditors, see, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2006) (known as the
"cramdown" provisions), but they are beyond the scope of this Note.
53. See FREY, supra note 33, at 243.
54. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2006); see also HERBERT, supra note 34, at 312.
55. 11 U.S.C. § 1106.
56. Id. § 704(a)(1).
57. See PASKAY, supra note 18, at 223.
58. 11 U.S.C § 704(a)(2).
59. See PASKAY, supra note 18, at 222; see also FREY, supra note 33, at 7 (stating that
one of the trustee's objectives is to maximize the distribution of assets to the creditors).
60. See PASKAY, supra note 18, at 223.
61. Id. at 222; see also DANIEL R. COWANS, COWANs BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE
451-52 (1963) (describing the trustee as a representative of creditor interests intended as a
substitute for individual creditor efforts).
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creditors' will, however, and should exercise his own independent
judgment.62
As mentioned above, the commencement of a bankruptcy case creates an
estate comprised of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property
as of the commencement of the case." 63 In accordance with these interests,
and in his role as representative of this estate, the trustee has the capacity to
sue and be sued.64 In other words, the trustee has the power to bring any
cause of action that would have been available to the company at the time
of filing for bankruptcy. 65 With specific respect to whether the trustee has
standing to sue a third-party service provider for aiding or negligently
facilitating corporate managers' fraud, it would seem that if the company
had standing to sue, so would the trustee. 66
A company's standing to sue in such cases depends on its fulfillment of
constitutional standing requirements. There are three constitutional
requirements for Article III standing. First, the plaintiff must allege that he
has suffered or will imminently suffer an injury. Second, he must allege
that the injury is traceable to the defendant's conduct. Third, the plaintiff
must show that a favorable federal court decision is likely to redress the
injury.67
With regard to the first requirement, there is substantial agreement that
where fraud or mismanagement harms a corporation's assets, it is the
corporation that suffers the primary injury. 68  The second and third
requirements are easily met in these situations as well. The injury that the
corporation alleges is directly related to the wrongful or negligent behavior
of the third-party defendants, and any damages recovered by such a suit
would flow directly to the debtor's estate.69 Since the debtor corporation
would meet these constitutional standing requirements, the trustee who
succeeds to the rights and interests of the debtor meets them as well. 70
62. See PASKAY, supra note 18, at 222-23.
63. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).
64. Id. § 323(a)-(b). As noted earlier, the trustee may try to bring claims against third
parties in this capacity.
65. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 82 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5868.
66. See id.
67. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756-58 (1984); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION 60-61 (5th ed. 2007); see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 727
(1972) (finding that plaintiff corporation lacked standing because it failed to show injury to
itself).
68. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of PSA, Inc. v. Edwards, 437 F.3d 1145,
1149-50 (11 th Cir. 2006); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co.,
267 F.3d 340, 348 (3d Cir. 2001). But see Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944
F.2d 114, 120 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that, "although a class of creditors had suffered harm,
the corporation itself had not").
69. Failure to meet these latter two requirements is often found in taxpayer standing
cases or cases involving generalized grievances. See, e.g., Allen, 468 U.S. at 755 (holding
that "[r]espondents here have no standing to complain simply that their Government is
violating the law").
70. "'Simply because the creditors of a[n] estate may be the primary or even the only
beneficiaries of such a recovery does not transform the action into a suit by the creditors'
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Thus, there would appear to be no federal constitutional standing bar to
third-party claims by the trustee.
B. Agency Law and Imputation
How one defines the debtor's estate and how one defines the trustee's
rights in relation to the legal rights of that estate are central to the debate
over whether the bankruptcy trustee can recover from third parties in the
types of situations described above. The threshold question is whether the
fraud perpetrated by the corporate managers should be imputed to the
corporation itself.71 In the bankruptcy context, the court must additionally
determine whether the fraud, if imputed to the corporation, is to be imputed
to the debtor's bankruptcy estate, so as to burden the trustee.
Whether such fraud is imputed to the corporation is a question of agency
law. The Restatement of Agency, section 5.03, states that "notice of a fact
that an agent knows or has reason to know is imputed to the principal if
knowledge of the fact is material to the agent's duties to the principal. '72 In
the corporate context, the manager is the agent, and the corporation is the
principal. It follows that if the manager of a corporation commits fraud (or
has knowledge of fraud) in a way that is material to his duties to the
corporation, the fraud is imputed to the corporation. 73 The purpose of this
fundamental concept of agency is that a principal should not be able to
employ an agent to act on its behalf while remaining immune from liability
for acts of the agent it has authorized. 74 Put another way, the principal
"should not, by using an agent, be advantaged . . .compared with the
[position he would be in had he] acted personally rather than through an
agent."'75 Because imputation makes the principal liable for an agent's
authorized behavior, the doctrine incentivizes principals to hire responsible
agents. 76
and therefore deprive the trustee of standing. Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 349 (quoting In re Jack
Greenberg, Inc., 240 B.R. 486, 506 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1999)) (alteration in original); see also
Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. of N.Y., 406 U.S. 416, 429 (1972) (holding that
the trustee cannot bring a claim that belongs to the creditors and not the estate).
71. Imputation is defined as "[tihe act or an instance of imputing something, esp[ecially]
fault or crime, to a person." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 774 (8th ed. 2004).
72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 (2006).
73. See, e.g., Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 454 (7th Cir. 1982).
74. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b ("An agent undertakes to act on
behalf of a principal .... A principal's right to control an agent enables the principal.., to
ensure compliance with [his duty to keep the principal informed]."). This is analogous to the
principle of vicarious liability in torts. Imputation is the price to be paid for employing
another. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 500 (5th ed. 1984).
75. Deborah A. DeMott, When Is a Principal Charged with an Agent's Knowledge?, 13
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 291, 312 (2003). This justification is rooted in the identity that is
presumed to exist between the principal and the agent. Id. It prevents the principal from
being able to wait until after the fact to determine whether it wants to be bound by what its
agent has done. Id. at 316.
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 cmt. b (1979) ("Although there has been no
fault on the part of a corporation . . . the imposition of punitive damages upon the
[corporation] serves as a deterrent to the employment of unfit persons for important
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decision in Cenco Inc.
v. Seidman & Seidman77 demonstrates how agency imputation principles
can be used to prevent a corporation from recovering against third-party
service providers for fraud. In that case, Cenco sought to recover from its
accountants for taking part in the fraud perpetrated by Cenco's managers.
78
Abiding by the agency principles stated above, the Seventh Circuit in
Cenco imputed the fraud perpetrated by the managers to the corporation
itself.79 Imputing the fraud to the corporation has the effect of treating the
corporation as if it had committed the fraud. Treating the corporation as
such, the court reasoned that "a participant in a fraud cannot also be a
victim entitled to recover damages, for he cannot have relied on the truth of
the fraudulent representations." 80 In other words, the court held that the
fraud simply knocked out a crucial element of the plaintiffs prima facie
case-reliance. 81 Therefore, the corporation could not recover from the
third party.
The Seventh Circuit also acknowledged the policy rationale for using
imputation in this scenario. The objective of liability is "to compensate the
victims of wrongdoing and to deter future wrongdoing." 82 The Cenco court
was concerned that if the corporation and its shareholders were allowed to
recover, the corrupt officers could benefit. 83 This would not serve as a
sufficient deterrent to committing fraud.
When fraud is imputed to the corporation and the corporation tries to
recover damages from a third-party service provider for contributing to (or
failing to detect) the fraud, the third party may also raise what is called the
in pari delicto defense. In pari delicto literally means "in equal fault."'84 It
is a doctrine of equity that prevents a deliberate wrongdoer from recovering
from someone who has aided the wrongdoing. 85  Therefore, if the
managers' fraud is imputed to the corporation, lack of reliance or the in pari
delicto defense could prevent the corporation from recovering against a
positions."); see also Demott, supra note 75, at 315-18; Andrew J. Morris, Clarifying the
Imputation Doctrine: Charging Audit Clients with Responsibility for Unauthorized Audit
Interference, 2001 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 339, 350.
77. 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1982) (Judge Richard Posner writing for a unanimous court).
78. Id. at 451.
79. Id. at 454-56.
80. Id. at 454.
81. A necessary element of fraud is reliance. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 685 (8th ed.
2004).
82. Cenco, 686 F.2d at 455.
83. Id.
84. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 806 (8th ed. 2004).
85. "It is a defense based on the legal doctrine that a party cannot seek relief for a crime
or tort for which he or she is also to blame." Lin, supra note 1. The doctrine also rests on the
rationale that "courts should not lend their good offices to mediating disputes among
wrongdoers," and "denying judicial relief to an admitted wrongdoer is an effective means of
deterring illegality." Risa Lynn Wolf-Smith, Innocent Trustee/Creditors Barred by Debtors'
Past Wrongs: It Just Ain't Right, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2007, at 42, 42 (quoting
Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards Inc. v. Bemer, 472 U.S. 299, 306 (1985)).
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third party, 86 even if the third party were partially to blame for the fraud.8 7
Not only can these defenses be used against solvent corporations; they can
theoretically be used against a trustee representing a bankrupt corporation's
estate on the assumption of imputation from the corporation to the trustee.
There are exceptions to the rules of imputation stated above that would
prevent a third party from being able to use these defenses. An agent's
actions might not be imputed to the principal if they were not committed in
the course of employment, or if the actions were adverse to the principal's
interests. 88 The latter case is known as the "adverse interest" exception. 89
The adverse interest exception bars imputation when the actions of an agent
demonstrate that he has "totally abandoned" the interests of the
corporation. 90
The court in In re Sharp International Corp. found the exception to
apply.9 1 In Sharp, certain managers of the corporation had looted money
(that they had fraudulently raised) from the company, diverting more than
$44 million of Sharp funds to companies that had no affiliation with
Sharp. 92 Since the plaintiff sufficiently proved this adversity of interest
between the agents and the principal, the fraud was not imputed to Sharp. 93
The exception is in line with the principles behind the agency doctrine.
The ordinary concern, that the principal will benefit from an agent's actions
but avoid liability for them, does not apply here because the principal is
being harmed, not helped, by the agent's actions. 94 It would not be fair to
hold the corporation liable for the actions of someone who intends to do it
harm.
There is a counterexception to the adverse interest exception, however.
If the agent who has acted adversely to the interests of the corporation is the
"sole representative" of the principal, then the adverse interest exception
does not apply.9 5 This is known as the "sole actor" counterexception to the
86. The applicability of the in pari delicto defense may vary depending on the nature of
the tort.
87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b (2006). "Imputation may provide
the basis for a defense that may be asserted by third parties when sued by or on behalf of a
principal. Defenses such as in pari delicto may bar a plaintiff from recovering from a
defendant whose conduct was also seriously culpable." Id.
88. Id. § 5.03(a) (stating the exceptions to imputation of knowledge to the principal).
This exception exists because when the agent has acted adversely, his conduct is "outside the
control and incentive structures that the principal has created," and the principal, therefore,
should not be liable for his conduct. DeMott, supra note 75, at 310.
89. See, e.g., In re Mediators, Inc., 105 F.3d 822, 827 (2d Cir. 1997) ("[T]he adverse
interest exception rebuts the usual presumption that the acts and knowledge of an agent
acting within the scope of employment are imputed to the principal.").
90. Id. (citing Center v. Hampton Affiliates, Inc., 488 N.E.2d 828, 830 (N.Y. 1985)).
91. In re Sharp Int'l Corp., 278 B.R. 28 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2002).
92. Id. at 32.
93. Id. at 39-42.
94. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
95. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340,
359 (3rd Cir. 2001).
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"adverse interest" exception.96 In In re Mediators, a bank assisted Richard
Manney, the sole shareholder of a corporation, in a fraudulent transaction to
shield an art collection from liquidation.97 The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that because Manney was the sole shareholder, his
actions, "by definition" were made on behalf of the corporation, regardless
of their adverse effect on it.98 The adverse interest exception did not apply,
and the sole shareholder's fraud was imputable to the corporation. 99
The rationale for this rule is that an "agent" cannot act adversely to the
corporation if he is the corporation. The counterexception is also in line
with agency law because the party who should have been informed of the
fraud is the agent himself, also acting in his capacity as principal.100 To let
the principal separate himself from the agent's actions would be irrational
because they are the same person. 10 1
The legal applicability of these general principles of agency depends on
their adoption by individual states. 102 In O'Melveny, the Supreme Court
affirmed that state law governs the question of whether knowledge of fraud
is imputed from managers of a corporation to the corporation itself.103
"There is no federal general common law," the court stated. 104 If a federal
court is to determine whether imputation from a manager to the corporation
is appropriate (in or out of bankruptcy), the court is to apply the relevant
state imputation law. 10 5 If no case law exists, courts have resorted to
divining how the state court would rule. 10 6
C. Framing the Debate over Trustee Recovery
In the bankruptcy context, the court must decide whether the fraud
should be imputed to the bankruptcy estate and the trustee who oversees it.
If the fraud is imputed, the estate and the trustee are burdened by the fraud
and are subject to the defenses described above. If the fraud is not imputed,
the trustee may not be subject to those defenses, and is more likely to
96. See, e.g., In re Mediators, Inc., 105 F.3d 822, 827 (2d Cir. 1997).
97. Id. at 824.
98. Id. at 827.
99. Id.
100. See Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 359 (citing In re Jack Greenberg, Inc., 212 B.R. 76, 86
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997)).
101. Some courts and commentators have also acknowledged a more controversial
exception known as the "innocent decision-maker" exception to imputation. See In re
Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., 330 B.R. 364, 381 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005). This exception
holds that if there are one or more innocent decision makers who, if aware of the fraud,
would have taken steps to bring the activity to an end, the fraud should not be imputed to the
corporation.
102. O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 83-84 (1994).
103. Id. (finding the contention that federal common law determines whether an officer's
knowledge should be imputed to the corporation "so plainly wrong").
104. Id. at 83 (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)).
105. See id. at 83.
106. See Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 455 (7th Cir. 1982) (seeking
to predict "how the Illinois courts might decide").
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recover. While courts agree that state law governs imputation to a
corporation, they have not agreed on the appropriate authority for
determining the extent to which corporate fraud should burden the
bankruptcy estate and the trustee. Here lies the crux of the debate.
Unfortunately, a line cannot be drawn neatly between proimputation and
anti-imputation camps. Courts that reach the same conclusion often do so
for significantly different reasons. On the proimputation side, some courts
rely heavily on section 541 to bar trustee recovery, 107 while others rely
more on state imputation law.' 08 Still others analyze the issue as one of
standing. 109 On the anti-imputation side, most courts ignore section 541,
aggressively interpreting state law to find imputation inappropriate and
permit recovery from third parties. 1 0 At the same time, commentators who
oppose imputation have conjured rationales for recovery that have little to
do with state law. Given these inconsistencies, it is difficult to discern a
concrete framework in which to place each decision. Accordingly, Part II
of this Note simply divides the courts and commentators into those that find
trustee recovery prohibited and those that find it appropriate. Part III seeks
to cast each of the courts' approaches into a more concrete and workable
framework (even though the courts themselves do not) in order to
understand what needs to be done to cure the inconsistent results.
107. Section 54 1(a) of title 11 of the U.S. Code provides that, "The commencement of a
case under ... this title creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of. . . all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C.
§ 541 (a) (2006). The courts in this category interpret this language to mean that the property
and interests of the estate are identical to those of the debtor corporation upon filing (and that
no postpetition events may be considered). This interpretation further leads to the
conclusion that the trustee who manages that estate also has exactly the same rights and
interests as the debtor-no more, no less. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 82 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5868. Therefore, he cannot assert any claims that the debtor
corporation would not have been able to assert and is subject to the same defenses as the
debtor corporation would have been. If past fraud would have prevented the corporation
from recovering against another party, then that fraud should prevent the trustee from
recovering as well. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267
F.3d 340, 355 (3d Cir. 2001); In Re Segerstrom, 247 F.3d 218, 224 (5th Cir. 2001).
108. See Baena v. KPMG LLP, 453 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2006).
109. See infra Part II.A.3.
110. According to these courts, since state law governs imputation, state law may allow
for some exceptions to the imputation doctrine-for example, barring the imputation defense
when the third party has actively participated in the fraud, or when the guilty managers have
been removed from the picture. See infra Part II.B.2. This side of the debate places greater
emphasis on the trustee's role as a substitute for individual creditor efforts. See supra notes
58-60 and accompanying text. These courts and commentators emphasize that, in cases
where the guilty managers are removed from the picture, there is no reason to impute the
fraud to the trustee. By this more nakedly policy-formed analysis, regardless of whether the
debtor (in whose shoes the trustee now stands) is saddled by fraud, the trustee should be able
to recover for the benefit of innocent creditors who have been harmed by the wrongdoer.
Since the end result of a suit would benefit only innocent parties, they argue that recovery
should not be barred by defenses such as in pari delicto. See infra Part II.B.2.
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II. CONFLICTING MEANS AND CONFLICTING ENDS: THE VARIETY OF
APPROACHES TO THE PERMISSIBILITY OF TRUSTEE RECOVERY
Part II.A of this Note focuses on the cases that have barred the trustee
from recovering from third parties. Of these courts, some have relied
heavily on section 541 to reach their result, while others have relied on the
state law of imputation with little or no awareness of federal bankruptcy
law's relevance. Still others have controversially evaluated the issue in
light of whether the trustee has standing to sue. It is clear that, despite the
uniformity of results on this side of the issue, there are significant
inconsistencies in reaching that result.
Part II.B of this Note highlights the cases that have allowed the trustee to
recover from third parties. These cases aggressively interpret state law in
order to find imputation inappropriate. Part II.B also describes the views of
numerous commentators who have come up with a variety of ways to
justify trustee recovery from third parties. Interestingly, many of these
justifications do not rely on state law and are significantly different than the
ones used by the courts.
A. Cases and Commentators Finding that Recovery by the Trustee Is
Barred
1. Cases Using Section 541 to Bar Recovery
The majority of courts dealing with this issue come to the conclusion that
a trustee, representing the bankruptcy estate of a debtor whose managers
have committed fraud, should not be able to recover from third-party
service providers who may have played a role in that fraud. They hold that
fraud by the managers of the corporation should be imputed to the trustee in
bankruptcy and allow third parties to invoke certain defenses against the
trustee's claims. Courts such as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty &
Co.111 reach this result because they believe that section 541 of the
Bankruptcy Code leaves no other choice.
In Lafferty, a lease-financing corporation operated a Ponzi scheme 112 in
which it issued fraudulent debt certificates to investors. 113 When the
company could not repay the outstanding debt, it filed for bankruptcy. 114 A
committee of unsecured creditors, acting as the trustee for the bankrupt
111. 267F.3d340.
112. A Ponzi scheme is a fraudulent investment scheme in which money from new
investors creates artificially high dividends for original investors without any operation or
revenue-producing activity other than the continual raising of new funds. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1198 (8th ed. 2004).
113. Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 343-44.
114. Id. at 344.
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estate, 115 brought suit on behalf of the debtor corporation. It claimed that
third parties (its counsel, accountant, and underwriter) had fraudulently
induced the corporation to issue the debt securities. 116 The third parties
argued that the fraud should be imputed to the trustee and that the doctrine
of in pari delicto established an affirmative defense against his claims."17
The trustee, in turn, argued that under Pennsylvania law, the in pari delicto
defense should not be available when it would produce an inequitable
result." 8 It argued that imputation was unwarranted because the fraud-
committing managers had been eliminated from the picture, and only
innocent creditors would benefit from recovery. 119
The court first addressed whether the conduct of the officers should be
imputed to the corporation. 120 The court applied the widely accepted
agency law standard (supported by Pennsylvania state law) that the conduct
of an agent should be imputed to the principal as long as it is (1) in the
course of the agent's employment, and (2) for the benefit of the
company.' 2' Interestingly, the court found that the second prong was not
satisfied because the managers' actions harmed the company by pushing it
into greater debt. 122 This would normally lead to the "adverse interest"
exception to imputation, in which the fraud is not imputed to the
corporation when the managers have abandoned the corporation's
interests. 23  However, the court found that the "sole actor"
counterexception applied. 124  It held that if the agent is the "sole
representative" of the principal, then the agent's fraudulent conduct is
imputable to the principal even though his actions may be adverse to the
principal's interests. 125 Consequently, the officer's fraud was imputed to
the corporation.
The court next addressed the issue of whether postpetition events could
be considered in evaluating the trustee's claim.126 Specifically, it addressed
the trustee's claim that fraud should not be imputed because the fraudulent
managers had been removed from the picture after filing, and all the
beneficiaries of the suit would be innocent creditors.127
115. Usually the creditors' committee and the trustee are two different parties. This was a
circumstance in which there was a stipulation under which the committee acquired all the
attributes of the trustee for the purposes of this case. Id. at 345. So for the purposes of this
discussion, this Note refers to the committee as the trustee when appropriate.
116. Id. at 344.
117. Id. at 354.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 355.
120. Id. at 358-59.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 359.
123. See In re Sharp Int'l Corp., 278 B.R. 28 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2002).
124. Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 360.
125. Id. at 359; see also supra note 96 and accompanying text.
126. Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 355-56.
127. Id. at 356-57.
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To decide whether the innocence of the committee (acting as trustee)
could be taken into account, the court looked to section 541 of the
Bankruptcy Code. The court held that since the estate consists of all
"'interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement' of
bankruptcy,"' 2 8 it was not entitled to take into account events that occurred
after the filing of bankruptcy when deciding whether the in pari delicto
defense should apply. 129 Consequently, the court could not take into
account the removal of guilty managers and the establishment of the
committee as an innocent successor because both these events had occurred
after the commencement of the case. 130
Since the innocence of the successor could not be taken into account, if
the debtor would have been subject to the defense at the time of filing, the
trustee would be subject to the same defense. Here, the debtor was guilty of
fraud and would have been subject to the in pari delicto defense. As a
result, the trustee was subject to the defense as well. 13 1
The court pointed out that the legislative history was even clearer on this
matter: "[Section 541] is not intended to expand the debtor's rights against
others more than they exist at the commencement of the case."132
Therefore, the fraud is imputed to the trustee, and the in pari delicto
doctrine constitutes an affirmative defense against the trustee's claims. 133
The Lafferty decision is a quintessential example of a court using section
541 of the Bankruptcy Code to conclude that the trustee's rights and
interests are no greater than those of the corporation at the time of filing.
Therefore, just as the fraud is imputed to the corporation, it is also imputed
to the trustee so as to prevent him from recovering from third parties in
these situations.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in In re Hedged-
Investments Associates134 came to the same conclusion by a virtually
identical, if not more forceful, reading of section 541. The court found that
section 541 "expressly prohibits" the trustee from recovering when the
debtor would not have been able to recover outside of bankruptcy. 135 It
elaborated that the phrase "as of the commencement of the case" has
temporal as well as qualitative limitations: temporal, in "establish[ing] a
clear-cut date after which property acquired by the debtor will normally not
become property of the bankruptcy estate," and qualitative in
"establish[ing] the estate's rights as no stronger than they were when
actually held by the debtor."'136
128. Id. at 356 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006)).
129. Id. at 356-57.
130. Id. at 357.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 356 (citing S. REP. No. 95-989, at 82 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5868).
133. Id. at 357-59.
134. 84 F.3d 1281 (10th Cir. 1996).
135. Id. at 1285.
136. Id. (citing Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, 885 F.2d 1149, 1154 n.7 (3d Cir. 1989)).
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Most recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in
Unsecured Creditors of PSA, Inc. v. Edwards,137 expressed its alignment
with the Third and Tenth Circuits. In deciding whether the trustee of a
bankrupt Ponzi scheme operator was barred from recovering from a bank
for aiding and abetting the fraud, the court held that "there is no suggestion
in the text of the Bankruptcy Code that the trustee acquires rights and
interests greater than those of the debtor."' 138 It continued, "[i]f a claim of
[the debtor] would have been subject to the defense of in pari delicto at the
commencement of the bankruptcy, then the same claim, when asserted by
the trustee, is subject to the same affirmative defense." 139
2. Cases Relying on State Imputation Law to Bar Recovery
While the Third, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have found that the
language of section 541 itself is sufficient to bar the trustee's claims, other
circuits have not relied so heavily on the Bankruptcy Code, instead placing
more emphasis on state imputation law. In Baena v. KPMG,140 a case
decided in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the fact pattern
was very similar to that in Lafferty. A software licensing company took on
massive debt in order to finance new acquisitions. It was later found that
managers had overstated revenues and profits, so the company, unable to
repay its debts, filed for bankruptcy. 141 Then, the trustee of the bankruptcy
estate tried to sue its accounting firm for failing to alert the company of the
fraud. 142 The court in Baena reached the same conclusion as the Lafferty
court. The fraud was imputed to the trustee, prohibiting recovery. 143 But,
notably, the Baena court did not refer to the Bankruptcy Code at all in its
decision.
Instead, the court simply relied on Massachusetts's state imputation law.
"[O]rdinary agency-based imputation rules appear to operate in
Massachusetts," the court stated.144 These "ordinary" imputation rules
dictated that the managers' fraud be imputed to the corporation and to the
trustee representing its bankruptcy estate. Therefore, when the trustee tries
to hold a third party liable for that same fraud, the in pari delicto defense
applies, barring recovery. 145
Similarly, in one of many opinions on the matter, the Second Circuit also
looked to state imputation law to bar trustee recovery from a third-party
137. 437 F.3d 1145 (11 th Cir. 2006).
138. Id. at 1150 (citing O'Halloran v. First Nat'l Bank of Fla., 350 F.3d 1197, 1202 (1 1th
Cir. 2003).
139. Id.
140. 453 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006).
141. Id. at 3.
142. Id. at 4.
143. Id. at 6-7.
144. Id. at 8.
145. Id. at 6-7. The court refused to adopt the narrower imputation doctrine proposed by
the trustee, stating that such changes were more appropriately left to the state courts. Id. at 8.
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service provider. 146 In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Color
Tile, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, LLP, the court considered the Texas law
proposition that "'where the wrong of the one party equals that of the other,
the defendant is in the stronger position,' and a court will not 'administer a
remedy." ' 147 Like the First Circuit in Baena, the Second Circuit presumed
(without elaboration) that if the corporation were to be subject to the in pari
delicto defense under state law, so would the trustee of the bankruptcy
estate.
148
3. Cases Barring Suits Because the Trustee Lacks Standing
While the decisions described above differ in terms of whether federal or
state law governs this issue, they all agree that the trustee at least has
standing to bring the claims sought. Other courts, however, believe that the
trustee lacks standing to bring the claims in the first place. Notably, lack of
standing in these cases is a federal law ground for dismissal. The landmark
case that has decided the issue in this way is Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.
v. Wagoner.14 9
In Wagoner, Herbert Kirschner formed HMK Management Corporation
and was its sole shareholder. He sold worthless notes and loan agreements
to his fellow church members and then used the proceeds to execute trades
in an account with Shearson, a brokerage firm.150 HMK subsequently went
bankrupt, and the trustee sued Shearson, alleging that Shearson had
breached its fiduciary duty to HMK.151
Unlike Lafferty and PSA, where the court ruled against the trustee's third-
party claims but assumed its standing to sue, the court in Wagoner held that
the trustee did not even have standing to bring the suit against the third
party to begin with. 152 It reasoned that the relevant claim only belonged to
the creditors. 153 It stated that, "[a] claim against a third party for defrauding
a corporation with the cooperation of management accrues to creditors, not
to the guilty corporation." 154
The court's decision turned on whether or not there had been injury to the
corporation "apart from that done to the third-party creditor note-
146. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Color Tile, Inc. v. Coopers &
Lybrand, LLP, 322 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2003).
147. Id. at 158 (citing 34 TEX. JUR. 3D Equity § 31 (2002)).
148. Id. at 161-63. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refrained from
actually interpreting Texas law here, but clearly approved of the district court's use of Texas
law as the appropriate authority for deciding whether in pari delicto applies. Significantly,
the court made no distinction between imputation to the corporation and imputation to the
trustee of the bankrupt estate.
149. 944 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1991).
150. Id. at 116.
151. Id. at 117.
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holders."'155 Interestingly, the court found that there was no injury to the
corporation itself, and "to the extent [the] claim alleges money damages to
the 'clients of HMK,' it belongs only to the creditors."' 156 Without
cognizable injury, the trustee representing the debtor's estate failed to meet
the constitutional standing requirements. 157
The Wagoner decision has been criticized on several grounds. First, the
court's finding that a corporation is not harmed when its assets are
squandered (as they were in this case) effectively ignores the existence of
the corporation during the bankruptcy process.' 58 This is an illogical
conclusion because the corporation often restructures and continues to
operate.' 59 Furthermore, the Wagoner court seems to acknowledge the
trustee's right to sue the guilty managers for damages done to the
corporation, so it is inconsistent to hold that the trustee does not have
standing to sue a third party for that same damage.160
Several other holdings within the Second Circuit followed Wagoner's
line of reasoning and held that the trustee does not even have standing to
sue third parties. In re Bennett Funding Group161 further complicated the
Wagoner doctrine by confusing lack of standing with in pari delicto. The
court in Bennett denied the trustee standing because the trustee could not
prove damage to the corporation itself.' 62 Furthermore, it held that, even if
there was damage to the corporation, the trustee lacked standing because of
the debtor's collaboration with the defendant. 163 Through this line of
reasoning, Bennett improperly "ushered in the in pari delicto approach" into
the standing issue, further complicating its application. 64
4. Policy Concerns of the "Antirecovery" Courts
Many of the circuit courts above have expressed reservations about their
own holdings from a policy perspective. Two main concerns arise. First,
the courts are hesitant to rule in favor of the defendants when the damages
from trustee recovery would be used to repay innocent creditors.' 65 But in
the final determination, they find that an alternate outcome is not justifiable
given the text of section 541: "It falls beyond the province of this court to
let policy considerations override our interpretation of the text and clear
155. Id. at 118-19.
156. Id. at 119.
157. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
158. Jeffrey Davis, Ending the Nonsense: The In Pari Delicto Doctrine Has Nothing to
Do with What Is § 541 Property of the Bankruptcy Estate, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 519,
525 (2005).
159. Id. at n.36.
160. Id. at 527.
161. 336 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2003).
162. Id. at 100.
163. Id. (citing Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 72 F.3d 1085, 1094 (2d Cir. 1995)).
164. Davis, supra note 158, at 528.
165. In re Hedged-Invs. Assocs., 84 F.3d 1281, 1285-86 (10th Cir. 1996).
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intent of an act of Congress . . . ."166 Also, while it is appealing to permit
trustee recovery so that innocent creditors can benefit, giving these damages
to the trustee does not ensure that they will be distributed to creditors in a
manner that is proportional to the harm suffered. 167
Second, some courts are concerned with underdeterring third-party
service providers by allowing them to go unpunished after being at least
partially responsible for the wrongdoing. 168 The trustee in Baena, for
example, argues there is an interest in "conscripting accounting firms as
policemen" in the post-Enron era. 169 The court, while sympathetic to this
view, finds that adopting such a policy would be the province of the
Massachusetts legislature and not the federal judiciary. 170
B. Cases and Commentators Finding that Recovery Should Not Be Barred
As articulated in Part II.A, the majority of courts have held that a
bankruptcy trustee cannot recover from third-party service providers for
negligence or complicity with regard to the fraud of the corporation's
managers. There are a few courts, however, that have permitted recovery in
the same or similar circumstances. Ironically, these courts defer to state
imputation law in much the same way the First Circuit does in Baena. But
they achieve their ends by a much more aggressive interpretation of that
state law. These courts have found that it is possible for the trustee to
inherit more rights than the debtor had upon filing, and purport to reach this
conclusion in the name of more equitable results. This is inconsistent with
the federal courts that have held that section 541 precludes such a
conclusion as a matter of law.
1. The O'Melveny Decision
Before discussing this side of the debate at length, it is necessary to
discuss the O'Melveny decision in more detail because of the extent to
which it is relied on in the "prorecovery" decisions.
O'Melveny is a landmark case in the way that it approaches the law of
imputation. In O'Melveny, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) had stepped in as a receiver for an insolvent savings and loan whose
officers had engaged in sham sales of assets to inflate profits.' 71 The FDIC
brought suit against the law firm of O'Melveny and Meyers, alleging
166. Id. at 1286.
167. Unsecured Creditors of PSA, Inc. v. Edwards, 437 F.3d 1145, 1151 (11 th Cir. 2006).
If the creditors sued independently of the trustee, "[they] would not risk dilution through
apportionment to senior creditors or unharmed creditors of equal priority." Id.
168. Baena v. KPMG, 453 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2006).
169. Id.
170. Id. In the wake of the recent mortgage crisis, one might also question the
appropriateness of assuming that all creditors are innocent. Some may have been negligently
complicit, in which case this policy rationale for recovery would be weakened.
171. Id. at 81-82.
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professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duties. 172 The FDIC
asserted that federal common law should govern whether the officers'
knowledge is imputed to the corporation, and that federal common law
should also govern whether the officers' knowledge should be imputed to
itself as receiver. 173 The Court unequivocally rejected the first contention:
"'There is no federal general common law' . . . and . . . the remote
possibility that corporations may go into federal receivership is no
conceivable basis for adopting a special federal common-law rule divesting
States of authority over the entire law of imputation."' 174
In turning to the FDIC's second contention-that federal common law
should determine whether knowledge of the fraud should be imputed to the
FDIC, as receiver-the Court took a more nuanced approach. At the time
of the decision, there was a statute, the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA), 175 governing the powers and
duties of the FDIC as receiver. 176 The statute stated that "the [FDIC] shall
... by operation of law, succeed to-all rights, titles, powers, and privileges
of the [bankrupt] institution." 177 O'Melveny argued that this statute meant
that any defense good against the original party is good against the
receiver. 178 The FDIC contended that the statute was a "nonexclusive grant
of rights to the FDIC receiver, which can be supplemented or modified by
federal common law .... 179 In other words, the FDIC argued that there
was a federal interest in giving it, as receiver, more rights than the bankrupt
debtor had.
The Court disagreed with the FDIC's arguments. It noted that FIRREA
articulated specific federal rules of decision "regarding claims by, and
defenses against, the FDIC as receiver." 180 Because of the specificity of the
statute, the Court found it "hard to avoid the conclusion that [FIRREA]
places the FDIC in the shoes of the insolvent," and that creating federal
common law exceptions would not supplement the scheme, but alter it.1 8 1
However, after this detailed analysis of how FIRREA would potentially
be applied to the case, the Supreme Court decided not to rule on those
172. Id. at 82.
173. Id. at 83. A receiver plays a role similar to that of a trustee, but does not take power
over the estate via the same provision of the Bankruptcy Code. See PASKAY, supra note 18,
at 183.
174. Id. (citing Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 33-34
(1956); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)). The court cited Cenco Inc. v.
Seidman & Seidman for the proposition that federal courts, when ruling on imputation of
knowledge to the corporation, are supposed to divine how the state court would rule. Id. at
84. The matter is "whether or not California chooses to follow the 'majority rule."' Id. at 85.
175. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) (2000).
176. O'Melveny, 512 U.S. at 86.
177. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i)).
178. Id. at 85-86.
179. Id. at 86.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 86-87.
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grounds because FIRREA was not enacted until after the breach. 182
Instead, it decided that federal common law rules of decision were
inappropriate in this instance because the respondent had "identified no
significant conflict [between state law and] an identifiable federal policy or
interest." 183 "The rules of decision at issue here do not govern the primary
conduct of the United States or any of its agents or contractors, but affect
only the FDIC's rights and liabilities, as receiver, with respect to primary
conduct on the part of private actors that has already occurred."' 184
Therefore, there was no federal interest significant enough to warrant a
federal rule of decision and to preclude the use of the state rule of decision
on this issue. 185 As articulated below, some courts have latched onto this
decision to justify adopting state imputation doctrines that permit the trustee
to recover from third parties.
2. Cases Relying on State Law to Permit Trustee Recovery
The two cases that best exemplify this side of the issue are In re Jack
Greenberg, Inc.186 and NCP Litigation Trust v. KPMG.187 Both cases rely
on state imputation law (or exceptions thereto) to permit the trustee to
recover from third-party service providers.' 88  These decisions
acknowledge basic agency doctrine. However, they argue that in certain
circumstances exceptions to those rules must be made in order to achieve
fair results. They aggressively interpret state law to justify these
exceptions.
In Greenberg (a bankruptcy court case decided before Lafferty) the
plaintiff was a bankruptcy trustee of a meat importing company that was
forced into bankruptcy after it was revealed that one of the officers had
fraudulently produced prepaid inventory reports and fraudulently held
checks. 189 The trustee filed a claim against the accounting firm, Grant
Thornton LLP, alleging professional negligence, fraud, and negligent
misrepresentation. 190 Grant Thornton contended that the claims were
182. Id. at 87.
183. Id. at 88. The court found that the closest the respondent came to identifying a
federal interest was the contention that state imputation law might result in the depletion of
(or failure to enrich) Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) funds. Id.
184. Id.
185. Justice Antonin Scalia's suggestion that there is no federal common law in this area
may be the minority view. Congress enacted the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery
and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) to address the matter-suggesting the propriety of federal
lawmaking as a general matter in the area. This is consistent with federal jurisprudence
where common law governs but incorporates state law as the rule of decision. See RICHARD
H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 700 (5th ed. 2003).
186. 240 B.R. 486 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1999).
187. 901 A.2d 871 (N.J. 2006).
188. See infra notes 194-95, 208 and accompanying text.
189. Greenberg, 240 B.R. at 491, 498.
190. Id. at 499.
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barred because the knowledge of the wrongdoer must be imputed to the
trustee. 
19 1
The court first decided that, in light of O'Melveny, it was required to
"predict how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would rule if it were
presented with the [same] question."' 192  It held that, in light of
Pennsylvania law, equitable defenses (such as in pari delicto) are not
always valid. 193 The court relied heavily on the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court decision in Universal Builders v. Mood Motor Lodge.194 Using this
precedent, it found that it was permitted to use its discretion in determining
the applicability of third-party defenses.195 The court acknowledged that a
wrongdoer must not be allowed to profit from his own wrong. 196
Nevertheless, it felt entitled to deny the imputation defense when ruling
otherwise would create an inequitable result for innocent creditors. 197 To
deny the plaintiff recovery in this case would result in the enrichment of the
accountants at the expense of the innocent creditors of the bankrupt
corporation. 98
The bankruptcy court in Greenberg differentiated between cases where
the fraud-committing managers hold a substantial portion of the claims, and
cases where the beneficiaries of an action would be only innocent creditors.
In the latter case, it would not be just to bar claims based on the doctrine of
imputation. "The defense of in pari delicto loses its sting when the person
who is in pari delicto is eliminated."' 199 Accordingly, the court found that it
could grant the trustee more rights than the debtor would have had upon
filing.200
NCP is a more recent decision, by the New Jersey Supreme Court, that
follows a similar analysis. 20 1 In this case, two officers of the corporation
intentionally misrepresented details of the corporation's financial status to
its independent auditor. 202  A litigation trust was assigned to act as
successor-in-interest to the corporation and to represent the corporation's
shareholders. As in Greenberg, the court looked to state law to hold that
191. Id. at 500.
192. Id. at 501.
193. Id. at 504.
194. 244 A.2d 10 (1968).
195. Greenberg, 240 B.R. at 504.
196. Id. at 504-05.
197. Id. at 505-06 ("Accordingly, while the true and oft stated maxim that a trustee
standing in the shoes of the corporation takes no greater rights than the debtor is certainly the
beginning of my analysis, my inquiry does not end there.").
198. Id. at 506.
199. Id. at 503 n.26.
200. Id. at 505-06.
201. Despite being filed in state court, this suit involved a federal bankruptcy.
202. NCP Litig. Trust v. KPMG, 901 A.2d 871, 873 (N.J. 2006).
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the imputation doctrine did not bar the trust from recovering from third
parties for failing to uncover the fraud of its corporate officers. 20 3
The court acknowledged basic agency law, noting that the purpose of
agency doctrine is to protect innocent third parties and prevent a principal
from "avoiding the consequences of [its agent's] misdeeds." 20 4 But the
court found that this rationale for imputation breaks down in the corporate
auditing context because it is hard to absolve a party from responsibility
when it was negligent in its duty to the corporation.20 5 Since KPMG failed
in its duty to detect fraud, it was not in need of the protection that the
imputation defense would provide.20 6 Barring the suit would not "promote
the purpose of the imputation doctrine-to protect the innocent. '20 7
The court justified its abandonment of agency doctrine by looking to
state jurisprudence, citing a previous New Jersey case, Integrity Insurance
Co. v. Yegen Holdings Corp.208 That case held that an accountant's
culpability prevented it from raising the imputation defense. 20 9 In Integrity,
however, the third party had actively engaged in the fraud.210 The NCP
court claimed that since the Integrity court had not noted a difference
between active and passive engagement, it was not required to do so
either. 2'1
In addition to using state law to find exceptions to the agency doctrine,
the court took a "results-oriented approach." It concluded, like Greenberg,
that any recovery would compensate only innocent parties. It found no
evidence that the fraudulent managers would benefit from a successful
recovery from the auditors. 212 This argument mainly grew out of a
necessity to distinguish this case from the Cenco case. 213 The New Jersey
Supreme Court in NCP was unwilling to "punish the many for the faults [of
a few]."' 2 14 The court determined that, because recovery would not go to
guilty managers but to innocent creditors, not allowing the trust to recover
would be unfair and improper. 215
203. Id. at 873. The NCP Litigation Trust v. KPMG court also acknowledged that
imputation may be raised as a defense to bar claims against shareholders who engaged in or
were aware of the fraud.
204. Id. at 879 (citing Morris, supra note 76, at 350).
205. Id. at 880.
206. Id. at 882.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 880-82 (citing In re Integrity Ins. Co., 573 A.2d 928 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1990)).
209. Integrity, 573 A.2d at 941-42.
210. Id.
211. NCP, 901 A.2d at 881-82.
212. Id. at 885.
213. In a way, NCP is consistent with Cenco in that its decision largely revolves around
who is ultimately going to recover.
214. Id. at 885.
215. Id. Surprisingly, both NCP (a New Jersey Supreme Court case) and In re Jack
Greenberg, Inc. (a U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Bankruptcy
court case) are both located in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit-the court that
decided Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co. It is interesting
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3. Commentators' Justifications for Permitting Recovery
The loudest critique of the imputation doctrine in these circumstances
comes from commentators. Several commentators have argued that courts,
such as the Third Circuit in Lafferty, have erred in their interpretation of
section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code and have inappropriately applied the in
pari delicto doctrine so as to prevent a trustee from recovering against third
parties for abetting or failing to detect fraud. These commentators argue
that the trustee does not always "stand in the shoes" of the debtor and
should not always be subject to the same restrictions. Unlike the cases that
come down on this side of the debate, the commentators' analysis does not
involve deference to state law. They seem to acknowledge that section 541
of the Bankruptcy Code is the governing law on the issue, but have devised
interpretations that do not compel the conclusion that the trustee cannot
recover from third parties. These arguments further illustrate the diversity
of approaches to dealing with this issue.
William McGrane argues that courts have misinterpreted the extent to
which section 541(a) restrains the trustee. He attempts to ground his
argument in the legislative history of that section. "[They] have nearly
uniformly misconstrued the legislative history of the bankruptcy code by
failing to consider all of [the] legislative history in its proper context," he
claims. 2 16 McGrane cites a House report, stating that although the trustee
inherits the estate "as is" at the commencement of the case, he does not
inherit defenses that are "personal against the debtor."
2 17
The question then becomes whether the in pari delicto defense against
fraud is a defense "personal against the debtor." McGrane believes that in
pari delicto is the epitome of a personal defense.2 18 Therefore, according to
the legislative history, Congress never intended in pari delicto to apply to
bankruptcy trustees. 2 19
Tanvir Alam also argues that section 541 is not as restrictive as the courts
have made it out to be. He notes that the language "as of the
commencement of the case" applies to the rights to certain assets.
However, he argues that the existence of equitable defenses is not subject to
that these court decisions (which, if appealed, would have gone to the Third Circuit) stand in
such stark contrast to Lafferty.
216. William McGrane, The Erroneous Application of the Defense of In Pai Delicto to
Bankruptcy Trustees, 29 CAL. BANKR. J. 275, 275 (2007). The article relies on a statement
made by a congressman when discussing amendments to the code: "'To the extent such an
interest is limited in the hands of the debtor, it is equally limited in the hands of the estate
except to the extent that defenses which are personal against the debtor are not effective
against the estate."' Id. at 281 (citing 124 CONG. REc. H 11, 1096 (daily ed. Sept 28, 1978)
(statement of Rep. Edwards)).
217. Id. at281.
218. Id. at 285.
219. Id. at 291. This is plausible but seems difficult to square with section 541 's explicit
references to the "legal or equitable interests of the debtor."
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that same limiting phrase. 220 Just because section 541 subjects the trustee
to the same property rights as the debtor at filing does not mean that it
subjects the trustee to the same defenses as the debtor. 221
While section 541 freezes in time claims to property, it "should not
freeze in time the factual basis for the claims and defenses to a litigation
action that is based on a fluid factual underpinning." 222 By implication, the
court should consider certain facts that change over the course of
bankruptcy when it evaluates appropriate defenses. For example, if the
wrongdoer (e.g., a fraudulent manager) has been eliminated from the
situation, that development should be taken into account. Accordingly,
Alam believes that the Lafferty court erred in not considering the
postpetition removal of its guilty managers when evaluating the interests of
the estate under section 541. By this logic, if the wrongdoer has been
eliminated from the scenario, the rights of the estate can be expanded so
that it is no longer saddled by fraud, and the trustee should be allowed to
recover from third parties.223
Both McGrane and Alam seek to justify their flexible interpretations of
section 541 by pointing to the supposedly "fair" outcomes they achieve.
The windfall that third parties would receive as a result of imputation, they
argue, is inequitable. 224
A third commentator, Jeffrey Davis, also believes the proimputation
courts have misinterpreted section 541. His analysis differs in its approach.
Interestingly, he argues that state law does not always determine what is
property of the bankruptcy estate.225 He supports this assertion by citing
instances in which federal bankruptcy law and policy have been used to
determine property of the estate. 226 For example, he notes that the Supreme
Court has found that "even though future wages.., might be transferable
under non-bankruptcy law, they would nonetheless not be called property
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act. '227 In another example, federal
law and bankruptcy policy were used to determine whether a tax refund was
part of the estate. 228 Since these property issues were decided with an eye
220. Tanvir Alam, Fraudulent Advisors Exploit Confusion in the Bankruptcy Code: How
In Pai Delicto Has Been Perverted to Prevent Recovery for Innocent Creditors, 77 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 305, 322 (2003).
221. Id. "[T]he debtor, prepetition, and the estate, postpetition, must enjoy the same
property rights. This is not to say that they must equally suffer equitable defenses to
litigation claims .... Id.
222. Id. This argument seems to directly contradict at least one case explicitly holding
that the limitations embodied in the "at the commencement of the case" language of section
541 do not just apply to property. See supra Part II.A. 1.
223. Alam, supra note 220, at 323.
224. See, e.g., id. at 324.
225. Davis, supra note 158, at 534-35 ("The key to the proper analysis here is to
recognize that the question of what is the property of the estate is a question of federal
law.").
226. Id. at 536-37.
227. Id. at 536 (citing Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966)).
228. Id. at 537 (citing Kokoscka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974)).
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toward bankruptcy policy instead of state law, Professor Davis argues,
"courts [should be] empowered to view the in pari delicto defense in light
of its effect on federal bankruptcy policy" as well.
2 29
According to Davis, two fundamental bankruptcy policies are to be
furthered by disallowing the in pari delicto defense and permitting trustees
to recover from third parties for contributing to corporate fraud. First, "the
policy of fair treatment of creditors and investors requires that persons who
have enriched themselves through breach of a legal duty to the debtor must
be held liable in bankruptcy for the harm they have caused. '230 The second
policy is "the promotion of a high standard of business ethics among the
professionals who serve and participate in the affairs of corporate
managers." 23 1  For these reasons, he concludes that property of the
bankruptcy estate "should include claims against third parties who have
participated in harming the estate, and the in pari delicto defense should be
irrelevant. '232 Therefore, in his opinion, the trustee should be permitted to
recover from third parties on these claims.23
3
Perhaps the most persuasive argument against strict imputation, however,
is Davis's proposal for a more balanced approach. Davis suggests a
reformulation of the liability scheme, where third parties who were active
participants in the fraud should be liable only in proportion to the injury that
they caused. 234 As for the third parties who are merely guilty of failure to
blow the whistle, Davis proposes that they should be liable to the extent that
they could have prevented the harm.235
III. DEFINING THE RESPECTIVE ROLES OF FEDERAL AND STATE
AUTHORITY TO RESOLVE THE DEBATE
Part II illustrated the lack of consistency with which the state and federal
judiciary have addressed the permissibility of trustee recovery in the
scenarios described above. The result has been a great deal of confusion,
leaving attorneys and judges to weave a seemingly unnavigable web of
rationales to justify various conclusions. Part III seeks to untangle this web,
clearly articulating the framework within which this issue should be
addressed. The proposed framework soundly supports the outcomes of the
majority of these decisions (albeit in a slightly different way than the courts
themselves do), and identifies those few outliers.
229. Id. at 538.
230. Id. at 541.
231. Id. at 542.
232. Id. at 520.
233. One could argue that this point is significantly weakened in light of 0'Melveny &
Myers v. FDIC, which implies that defining the property of the estate is a state law question.
See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
234. Davis, supra note 158, at 548. This is similar to the way that joint tortfeasors who
cause indivisible harm are treated.
235. Id. at 549.
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This Note argues that federal authority, in the form of the federal
Bankruptcy Code, undoubtedly governs the creation of bankruptcy estates
and the rights of the trustees who oversee them. Specifically, section 541
articulates that the bankruptcy estate is comprised of "all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor . . . [at] the commencement of the case. '2 36
Significantly, the statute gives no guidance on the definition of "legal or
equitable interests of the debtor." Here, state law can be used to fill in the
content of the federal rule. There is strong precedent for using state law to
"fill the interstices of federal legislation." 237 Therefore, it is appropriate to
use state imputation law to fill the "interstices" of section 541-and define
the rights and interests of the debtor-provided that its use does not
contravene the express language of the federal statutory rule in any way.238
For example, the language, "at the commencement of the case," prevents
the bankruptcy estate from acquiring more rights than the company had
upon filing.239 Therefore, for a state-conferred right to become part of the
bankruptcy estate, it must be a right belonging to the solvent company
before filing. Consistent with this statutory framework, state legislatures or
judiciaries cannot create exceptions to imputation that would confer unique
rights upon companies based on their status as bankrupts beyond those
provided for by federal bankruptcy law. 240
The proposed framework clarifies the relationship between federal and
state law on this issue in a way that courts have not. Through this lens, the
outcome in Lafferty and its progeny can be justified, as can the outcome in
Baena.241 Furthermore, the Greenberg242 and NCP243 decisions become
outliers because of their attempts to grant special rights based on
bankruptcy beyond those conferred by the Bankruptcy Code.
Although they do not articulate the above reasoning, the Lafferty line of
cases strikes the proper balance between federal and state law on this issue.
Lafferty and its progeny explicitly acknowledge that section 541 is the
236. 11 U.S.C § 541(a) (2006).
237. United States v. Kimball Foods Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727 (1979). In that decision, the
Court concluded that "federal law governs questions involving the rights of the United States
arising under nationwide federal programs," and in the absence of a statutory rule of
decision, courts should "fill the interstices of federal legislation 'according to their own
standards."' Id. at 726-27 (quoting Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367
(1943)). "[W]hen there is little need for a nationally uniform body of law, state law may be
incorporated as the federal rule of decision." Id. at 728.
238. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (dictating that "the Judges in every State shall be bound"
by the laws of the United States).
239. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 82 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5868
(finding that section 541 "is not intended to expand the debtor's rights against others more
than they exist at the commencement of the case"); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors
v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 356 (3d Cir. 2001).
240. From a policy perspective, this is an important limitation. Federal bankruptcy law
involves a delicate balance between debtor and creditor interests. There is significant federal
interest in preventing state law from upsetting this balance.
241. See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 186, 189-200 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 187, 201-15 and accompanying text.
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governing federal rule for defining the rights and interests of the bankruptcy
estate. 244 The courts rely on state law inasmuch as it is necessary for
determining the prepetition rights and property of the debtor, but otherwise
look to the Bankruptcy Code as the appropriate authority.245 They find that
section 541, in its own right, precludes the bankruptcy estate from obtaining
more rights than the company had upon filing. 246 For example, in Lafferty,
the court uses section 541 to explicitly reject the argument, made in
Greenberg, that postpetition removal of the guilty managers may allow the
bankruptcy estate to become "unburdened" by their fraud. 247 For this
reason, the fraud was imputed to the trustee, prohibiting his recovery from
third parties.
Lafferty and its progeny are correct in holding that federal law is the
governing authority. To the extent that section 541 explicitly places
limitations on the rights and interests of the bankruptcy estate, those
limitations cannot be circumvented for equitable reasons. Although these
decisions could have placed greater emphasis on the intricacies of state law
and its significance in supplying the content of section 541, they properly
acknowledge state law as governing the law of imputation.
The Baena court, on the other hand, appears to underemphasize the role
that federal law plays in defining the rights and interests of the bankruptcy
estate. For example, the First Circuit does not even mention the federal
statute in its decision. Unlike the cases in the first category, it looks
exclusively to state imputation law to supply the rule of decision for that
federal law. 248 Relying on Massachusetts imputation law, it holds that the
managers' fraud is imputed to the company, and therefore, trustee recovery
is barred. 249
Despite the differing emphasis, the Baena court ends up in the same
substantive position as Lafferty. Yet, the First Circuit decision should have
explicitly acknowledged that federal law was the governing authority and
that its reliance on state imputation law was only appropriate inasmuch as it
was necessary to supply the content of the applicable federal rule (section
541). To its credit, however, the court does not entertain any of the
"fairness" arguments that would eviscerate the federal rule and give the
judiciary the exclusive authority to grant the trustee more rights and
244. See supra Part II.A. 1.
245. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of PSA, Inc. v. Edwards, 437 F.3d 1145,
1150-51 (11 th Cir. 2006); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co.,
267 F.3d 340, 359 (3d Cir. 2001); In re Hedged-Invs. Assocs., 84 F.3d 1281, 1285 (10th Cir.
1996).
246. See, e.g., Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 359.
247. See id. at 357 (holding that the language "at the commencement of the case"
prohibits courts from taking into account events that occurred after the commencement of
the bankruptcy when deciding whether defenses such as in pari delicto should apply).
248. See Baena v. KPMG, 453 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2006) ("In all events, ordinary agency-
based imputation rules appear to operate in Massachusetts ....
249. Id. at 6-7.
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interests than the debtor had upon filing.250 Nor does it find narrow
exceptions to rules of imputation, instead deferring to "ordinary agency-
based imputation rules. '251
Lastly, this Note finds that NCP and Greenberg are outliers in this
scheme. They are not outliers because they find that trustee recovery is
permissible, but rather because to justify trustee recovery they act as if
section 541, the governing federal rule, does not place any substantive
restrictions on the way in which state law can define the rights and interests
of the bankruptcy estate. Instead, these courts aggressively use state law, in
its own right, to define the rights and interests of the bankruptcy estate,
ignoring the explicit limitations of section 541.252 Specifically, they devise
exceptions to imputation that effectively give the bankruptcy estate greater
rights than the debtor had upon filing.253
These two cases interpret the O'Melveny decision to unequivocally hold
that state law governs imputation.254 But this is not entirely correct. While
the O'Melveny decision did decide that state law governs imputation law, it
also stated that, if there were an applicable federal statute (in that case
FIRREA), the court would be bound by that statute.255 In the cases
discussed above, a federal statute (11 U.S.C. § 541) does in fact govern. 256
So, while it may be appropriate for state imputation law to supply the
federal rule of decision, O 'Melveny dictates that it is not appropriate to act
as if there is no governing federal statute, when in fact there is. 2 5 7
Therefore, O'Melveny is perfectly consistent with the main argument made
here: that state imputation law does not govern in its own right, but instead,
applies as a rule of decision for the applicable federal rule.
A closer look at the authority upon which NCP and Greenberg base their
decisions further undermines their conclusions. For example, the New
Jersey case law relied on by the NCP court only weakly supports its
conclusion that imputation is improper. It cites Integrity, in which the court
250. Id. at 9 (rejecting the argument that in pari delicto should not be applied for
equitable reasons).
251. Id. at 8-9 (rejecting the innocent decision maker exception).
252. See supra Part II.B.2.
253. See supra Part II.B.2; see also In re Jack Greenberg, Inc., 240 B.R. 486, 506 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1999) (finding that "there are circumstances when the trustee's position as plaintiff
is different from that of the corporation, even when bringing the corporation's claim").
254. Greenberg, 240 B.R. at 500-02; NCP Litig. Trust v. KPMG, 901 A.2d 871, 880
(N.J. 2006).
255. FIRREA, similar to section 541, declared that the FDIC shall "succeed to-all
rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the insured depository institution." O'Melveny &
Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 86 (1994) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) (2000)). The
Court said, "this language appears to indicate that the FDIC as receiver 'steps into the shoes'
of the failed [savings & loan]." Id. However, FIRREA had been enacted after the initial suit,
so the U.S. Supreme Court declined to apply it. Id. at 87.
256. Unlike O'Melveny, where the case dealt with a receiver, the subject in the cases at
hand is a bankruptcy trustee who takes power over the estate as defined by section 541 of the
Bankruptcy Code-a federal statute.
257. O'Melveny, 512 U.S. at 86 (finding that, had FIRREA applied in this case, the
parties would be bound by its language).
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found that imputation was not proper when an auditor had actively engaged
in the fraud. 258 Rather than acknowledge that Integrity did not address the
issue, NCP held that, since the Integrity court did not distinguish between
active and negligent participation, it was not required to do so either, and
therefore, the NCP trustee could sue a negligent auditor as well. 259
In justifying trustee recovery, the New Jersey court purports to create its
own exception to imputation: negligent participation in the fraud by a third
party. 260 When a third party has negligently contributed to the fraud, and
the guilty managers have been removed from the picture, the court decides
that imputation is improper. 26 1 It is conceivable that such an exception to
imputation could be part of the state's laws applicable to all corporations,
including those that have not entered bankruptcy. 262 This would potentially
give the debtor a right against a third party "as of the commencement of the
case," in which case that right would become part of the bankruptcy estate.
However, NCP did not clearly articulate its exception as one of general
application (including companies outside of bankruptcy), and creating the
exception in this instance is yet another example of the state court trying to
reach a particular conclusion inconsistent with federal rules, federal court
decisions, and widely accepted agency doctrine.
The Greenberg decision stands on equally precarious precedent. It found
that under Pennsylvania law, imputation may fail to act as a total bar to
recovery "when the beneficiaries of the action are the corporation's
innocent creditors." 2 63 It based its decision on a 1968 Pennsylvania state
case reaching the same conclusion. 264 That case, in turn, relied only on a
258. NCP, 901 A.2d at 878 (citing In re Integrity Ins. Co., 573 A.2d 928 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1990)).
259. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
260. NCP, 901 A.2d at 887 (finding that shielding a negligent auditor from liability would
violate "principles of fairness and equity"). In a decision issued immediately before the
publication of this Note, the Third Circuit agreed with the New Jersey court's finding of such
an exception. See Thabault v. Chiat, No. 06-2209, 2008 WL 4138407, at *14 (3rd Cir. Sept.
9, 2008). However, that case dealt with a receiver, whose rights are not governed by section
541 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at *2.
261. Yet, for the proposition that absolving negligent auditors is difficult to justify, the
NCP court only cites several law review articles. NCP, 901 A.2d at 880. It even takes one
quote completely out of context to support its conclusion. Quoting Deborah A. DeMott,
supra note 75, the court states, "Absolving negligent corporate auditors 'is difficult to
rationalize and to justify or explain in any satisfying or comprehensive way."' NCP, 901
A.2d at 880. Professor Demott's actual statement is: "Imputation has been characterized as
a disorderly doctrine that is difficult to rationalize and to justify or explain in any satisfying
or comprehensive way." Demot, supra note 75, at 291. The New Jersey Supreme Court
manipulates a generally benign statement to mean that absolving negligent third parties is
unjustified.
262. Such an exception, however, would violate basic agency principles. Practically, it
would mean that a company, whose managers had committed fraud, could immunize itself
from imputation by simply firing the guilty managers. Such an exception would render all of
agency law unworkable and meaningless. Nevertheless, states are free to diverge from
agency principles as they choose.
263. In re Jack Greenberg, 240 B.R. 486, 506 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1999).
264. Id. at 504 (citing Universal Builders, Inc. v. Moon Motor Lodge, Inc., 244 A.2d 10
(Pa. 1968)).
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1907 New Jersey decision and a 1934 Second Circuit dissenting opinion for
that same proposition. 265 The absence of more recent decisions to support
its conclusion further weakens a decision already subject to criticism for
seeming to ignore the limitations of applicable federal law.
In addition, justifying recovery because imputation would lead to
inequitable results for innocent creditors ignores the basic principles of
standing discussed above. 266 A trustee has standing to bring a suit because
he represents the party who has suffered injury. The purpose of the suit is
to redress the injury that was inflicted on the debtor corporation. 267
Whether innocent creditors will have their injuries redressed as a result of a
suit is irrelevant in this regard and therefore should not be taken into
account.26
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Most of the commentators' arguments discussed in Part II are difficult to
square with this Note's thesis. 269 There is one, however, that may be
workable within the framework proposed by this Note and provides a good
example of how this framework may be put to use. Professor Davis argues
that third parties who were active participants in the fraud should be liable
to the trustee in proportion to the injury that they caused. 270 This would be
a conceivable outcome, as long as state imputation law permitted such a
result. With respect to all companies, a state legislature or judiciary could
create an exception to imputation doctrine where a corporation could
recover from third parties that actively conspired in the fraud in proportion
to the damage the third party caused. As long as the company possessed
such a right before the filing of a bankruptcy petition, the trustee could
recover from that third party without contravening the express language of
section 541.27 1 Such a solution allows for flexibility on a state-by-state
basis, while not altering the central premise of section 541: that the rights
or interests of the estate may not be altered as a result of the bankruptcy.
The rights and interests of the bankruptcy estate are limited to the rights and
interests of the debtor as they existed before filing.
CONCLUSION
In the end, it is clear that section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code is a federal
rule that applies to the creation of all bankruptcy estates and to the trustees
265. Universal Builders, 244 A.2d at 13-14.
266. See supra Part I.A.
267. The trustee legally represents the bankruptcy estate of the debtor corporation. See 11
U.S.C. § 323(a) (2006).
268. Recently, however, the Second Circuit has ruled that creditors may assign their
interest to the trustee, in which case the trustee may be able to bring claims on their behalf.
See In re CBI Holding Co., 529 F.3d 432, 459 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that such an
assignment permits more "efficient administration of the reorganization").
269. See supra Part II.B.3.
270. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
271. Since the trustee inherits all the rights and interests of the debtor as of the
commencement of the case, any interests the debtor obtained before the filing become
interests of the bankruptcy estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a); supra Part II.A. 1.
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who oversee them. Furthermore, the statute dictates that the estate consists
of the legal and equitable interests of the debtor at the time of filing, and
those rights and interests cannot be altered by postpetition events. States
are free to apply their own law to determine the rights and interests of the
company. In doing so, they are entitled to devise their own exceptions to
imputation. In order for those exceptions to apply to the bankruptcy trustee,
however, they must be exceptions applicable to the company before filing.
States should be careful not to create exceptions to imputation that would
defy the basic purposes of agency law. This proposed framework would
strike a proper balance between acknowledging the supremacy of federal
law and allowing the states to have autonomy in determining the rights and
interests of the bankruptcy estate.
Notes & Observations
